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INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are organizations representing women and 
men of faith, parents and children, and employees of 
numerous organizations. They respectfully ask this 
Court to recognize that women’s religious and repro-
ductive liberty should not be defeated by new govern-
ment regulations that leave contraceptive coverage 
unavailable to women employees and their families. 
 CHILD USA is the leading national non-profit 
think tank working to end child abuse and neglect in 
the United States. CHILD USA pairs the best social 
science research with the most sophisticated legal 
analysis to determine the most effective public policies 
to end child abuse and neglect. CHILD USA produces 
evidence-based solutions and information needed by 
policymakers, organizations, media, and society as a 
whole to increase child protection and the common 
good. #SoKidsStayKids 
 DignityUSA was founded in 1969 and is an or-
ganization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) Catholics and supporters. Among the areas of 
concern outlined in its Statement of Position and Pur-
pose is the promotion of “equal access and justice in all 
areas of health care and healing.” DignityUSA is con-
cerned that LGBT people could be denied equal access 
 
 1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No 
persons other than the Amici or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to this brief ’s preparation or submission. All parties 
have consented in writing to the filing of this Amicus brief. 
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to health care services if employers are allowed to re-
strict health coverage on the basis of the religious be-
lief of the owners. 
 New Ways Ministry represents Catholic lay peo-
ple, priests, and nuns who work to ensure that the hu-
man dignity, freedom of conscience, and civil rights of 
LGBT people are protected in all circumstances, in-
cluding in making decisions about healthcare. New 
Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice 
and reconciliation for people and the wider Catholic 
Church. Through education and advocacy, New Ways 
Ministry promotes the full equality of LGBT people in 
church and society. New Ways Ministry’s network in-
cludes Catholic parishes and college campuses 
throughout the United States. 
 The Quixote Center is a social justice center 
founded in 1976, animated by Catholic social teaching, 
committed to the full participation of all people in 
church and society. A key expression of this commit-
ment to inclusion in terms of gender and sexuality is 
the translation and publication of the Inclusive Bible 
and Lectionaries, which engage the organization in 
communication with church workers and the broader 
community in a variety of Christian denominations. 
This broader commitment to gender justice entails a 
commitment to reproductive justice and the recogni-
tion of equitable access to healthcare as a human right. 
 The Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics 
and Ritual (WATER) is a non-profit educational or-
ganization made up of justice-seeking people, from a 
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variety of faith perspectives and backgrounds, who 
promote the use of feminist religious values to make 
social change. WATER believes that women’s health 
decisions are private, and that the community’s re-
sponsibility is to make health care available for every-
one. WATER participates in this Amicus brief because 
a just society both respects privacy and promotes 
health. 
 The Women’s Ordination Conference (WOC), 
founded in 1975, is the oldest and largest national or-
ganization that works to ordain women as priests, dea-
cons and bishops into an inclusive and accountable 
Catholic church. WOC affirms women’s gifts, openly 
and actively supports women’s voices, and recognizes 
and values all ministries that meet the spiritual needs 
and human rights of all people. WOC promotes respect 
and self-determination of all people based on personal 
discernment. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 “[W]e are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people 
of almost every conceivable religious preference,” 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961). We ask 
this Court to respect those preferences by affirming the 
judgment of the Third Circuit in this case. Pennsylva-
nia v. President, 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 At issue are two government rules that reduce em-
ployees’ access to contraceptive insurance. See Reli-
gious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage 
4 
 
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable 
Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be cod-
ified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Ac-
commodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 
57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147). Those rules 
authorized all private entities to opt out of the 
contraceptive guarantee for religious reasons; 
allowed all but publicly traded corporations to 
do so for moral reasons; reiterated that com-
pliance with the accommodation was volun-
tary; and affirmed that the rules do not 
impose any notice requirement on employers 
that opt out. 
Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp’n [to cert petition] 7–8. 
 On behalf of thousands of employees of religious 
organizations and their dependents, Amici urge this 
Court to affirm the Third Circuit’s ruling that the gov-
ernment’s amendments to the contraception insurance 
coverage rules are illegal. Pennsylvania v. President, 
930 F.3d 543, 572 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Because [42 U.S.C.] 
§ 300gg-13(a) [(2018)] does not authorize the Agencies 
to exempt plans from providing the required coverage, 
the Agencies’ authority under the ACA to enact the 
Final Rules is without merit.”). The rules limit em-
ployee access to contraception in two ways. First, they 
exempt more employers from the insurance require-
ment. Moreover, they end the previous accommodation, 
which had required objecting employers to notify some-
one of their decision not to provide coverage, so that an 
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alternative source of insurance coverage could be 
found. These new harsh rules leave many women of 
faith without contraceptive coverage and force them to 
pay for their own contraception. 
 Although RFRA requires that these employees’ 
compelling interests in religious and reproductive free-
dom be considered in any accommodation of their em-
ployers’ religious freedom, the government has now 
expanded the exemption and ended the accommoda-
tion that gave employees coverage. More employers 
have now received a complete exemption from the birth 
control benefit of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), with 
no requirement to tell anyone of their decision. This 
overbroad and total exemption unduly restricts em-
ployees of faith and their dependents from protecting 
their own compelling interests. Thus the government’s 
exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which does not per-
mit “requests for religious accommodations [that] be-
come excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other 
institutionalized persons, or jeopardize an institution’s 
effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 
709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s parallel statute, 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (2018)). 
 “At some point, accommodation [of religious free-
dom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of reli-
gion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quot-
ing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached here, 
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where the government gives Petitioners a complete ex-
emption from the contraceptive benefit. Like the Con-
necticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed] 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified 
right not to work on whatever day they designate as 
their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this case 
violates the Establishment Clause through its “un-
yielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations] 
over all other interests,” especially the interests of 
women of faith in furthering their reproductive health 
and protecting their religious freedom. Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985); Cut-
ter, 544 U.S. at 722. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 According to the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018), the govern-
ment may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion only if it uses the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling government interest. This 
Court has ruled that requiring religious organizations 
to provide contraceptive insurance coverage directly to 
their employees substantially burdened their religion. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 720 
(2014). This Court has never ruled that the organiza-
tions’ related accommodation—namely, to notify either 
the government or their insurance company of their 
moral objection to contraception—placed a substantial 
burden on their religion. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 
S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (per curiam) (declining to 
7 
 
rule on whether the accommodation imposes a sub-
stantial burden). Eight of nine courts of appeals 
have ruled, however, that the accommodation did not 
substantially burden the employers’ religious free-
dom.2 
 Nonetheless, the government argues that RFRA 
authorized it to pass two new rules on contraceptive 
insurance coverage. See Religious Exemptions and Ac-
commodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Ser-
vices Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 
57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Cov-
erage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Afford-
able Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). These rules had two 
consequences that have affected Amici, who include 
women of faith who choose to use contraception. First, 
the rules expanded the numbers of employers who are 
exempt from the insurance mandate. Second, the rules 
turned the accommodation into a voluntary choice for 
employers, meaning they do not have to notify anyone 
 
 2 See, e.g., Little Sisters of Poor House v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151 (10th Cir. 2015); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015); Priests for Life v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 
2014); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459–63 (5th 
Cir. 2015); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 611–15 
(7th Cir. 2015); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 
207, 218–26 (2d Cir. 2015); Mich. Cath. Conf. & Cath. Family 
Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2015); Eternal 
Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Hu-
man Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1148–51 (11th Cir. 2016); but see 
Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015).  
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of their choice not to provide contraceptive coverage. 
This has resulted in women losing their no-cost contra-
ception, which the Affordable Care Act (ACA) guaran-
teed them. 
 In effect, the administration has removed a non-
burden from employers and placed a substantial bur-
den on employees like us women of faith. Government 
officials were vague in predicting how many employees 
would be affected by their new rules. See Religious Ex-
emptions and Accommodations Under the ACA, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 57,550 (“[T]here is not reliable data avail-
able to accurately estimate the number of women who 
may lose contraceptive coverage under these rules, and 
. . . [there are] various reasons why it is difficult to 
know . . . how many women will be impacted by those 
decisions.”); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations 
Under the ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,627 (“[G]eneral com-
ments did not . . . substantially assist the Departments 
in estimating the number of women that would poten-
tially be affected by these exemptions for moral convic-
tions specifically. . . . ”). We would like the Court to 
understand that women are losing some insurance cov-
erage and also having to pay for contraception them-
selves. This contradicts the lessons of this Court in 
Hobby Lobby, other RFRA cases, and the First Amend-
ment itself—that women should enjoy the no-cost con-
traceptive insurance that the Affordable Care Act 
requires. 
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I. The Government’s New Rules Have Taken 
Benefits Away from Employees. 
 In Hobby Lobby, this Court approved an accommo-
dation for employers who were otherwise expected to 
provide their employees directly with contraceptive in-
surance, even though the employers morally disap-
proved of contraception. 573 U.S. at 693. Specifically, 
the employers did not have to provide the insurance 
directly. Id. at 731. Instead, their insurance companies 
provided it. Id. As this Court explained: 
To qualify for this accommodation, an em-
ployer must certify that it is such an organi-
zation. [45 C.F.R.] § 147.131(b)(4) [(2013)]. 
When a group-health-insurance issuer re-
ceives notice that one of its clients has in-
voked this provision, the issuer must then 
exclude contraceptive coverage from the em-
ployer’s plan and provide separate payments 
for contraceptive services for plan partici-
pants without imposing any cost-sharing re-
quirements on the eligible organization, its 
insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. 
§ 147.131(c). Although this procedure re-
quires the issuer to bear the cost of these ser-
vices, HHS has determined that this 
obligation will not impose any net expense on 
issuers because its cost will be less than or 
equal to the cost savings resulting from the 
services. 78 Fed. Reg. 39[,]877 [(July 2, 2013)]. 
Id. at 698–99. The accommodation system ensured 
that the employees would still have access to contra-
ceptive insurance “without cost sharing.” Id. at 692. 
10 
 
Therefore, this Court concluded, the “effect of the HHS-
created accommodation on the women employed by 
Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in 
these cases would be precisely zero.” Id. at 693 (em-
phasis added). 
 Some employers have nonetheless challenged the 
accommodation, arguing that it burdened their reli-
gion to notify either the government or the insurance 
company of their moral position on contraception. 
Eight of nine courts of appeals ruled there was no bur-
den in the accommodation. See Little Sisters of Poor 
House v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(“It is not a substantial burden to require organizations 
to provide minimal information for administrative pur-
poses to take advantage of that accommodation.”); Ge-
neva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Under [the Washing-
ton v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) interpre-
tation of the RFRA definition of substantial burden], 
can the submission of the self-certification form, which 
relieves the appellees of any connection to the provi-
sion of the objected-to contraceptive services, really im-
pose a ‘substantial’ burden on the appellees’ free 
exercise of religion? We think not.”); Priests for Life v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 246 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The Accommodation Does Not Sub-
stantially Burden Plaintiff ’s Religious Exercise . . . 
[i]nstead, the accommodation provides Plaintiffs a sim-
ple, one-step form for opting out. . . .”); E. Tex. Baptist 
Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Be-
cause RFRA confers no right to challenge the 
11 
 
independent conduct of third parties, we . . . conclud[e] 
that the plaintiffs have not shown a substantial bur-
den on their religious exercise.”); Univ. of Notre Dame 
v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 618 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen 
we compare the burden on the government or third 
parties of having to establish some entirely new 
method of providing contraceptive coverage with the 
burden on Notre Dame of simply notifying the govern-
ment . . . we cannot conclude that Notre Dame has yet 
established its right to [a preliminary injunction].”); 
Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 220 
(2d Cir. 2015) (“Viewed objectively, completing a form 
stating that one has a religious objection is not a sub-
stantial burden.”); Mich. Cath. Conf. & Cath. Family 
Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 752 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(“[A]s we held before, ‘[t]he government’s imposition of 
an independent obligation on a third party does not im-
pose a substantial burden on the appellants’ exercise 
of religion.’ ” (quoting Mich. Cath. Conf. v. Burwell, 755 
F.3d 372, 388 (6th Cir. 2014))); Eternal Word Television 
Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t Health & Human 
Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 1148 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[We] con-
clude that the government has not put plaintiffs to the 
choice of violating their religious beliefs or facing a sig-
nificant penalty. We hold there is no substantial bur-
den.”); but see Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946, 950 
(8th Cir. 2015) (relying on Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. 
United States HHS, 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015) to 
“conclude that by coercing Dordt and Cornerstone to 
participate in the contraceptive mandate and accom-
modation process under threat of severe monetary 
penalty, the government has substantially burdened 
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Dordt and Cornerstone’s exercise of religion.”), vacated 
sub nom. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. CNS 
Int’l Ministries, 136 S. Ct. 2006, 2006 (2016). This 
Court heard the employers’ appeal in Zubik v. Burwell, 
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). This Court did 
not reach a decision on the employers’ argument. 
Id. 
 Instead, this Court’s remand offered a chance to 
develop a proposal that “accommodates petitioners’ re-
ligious exercise while at the same time ensuring that 
women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive 
full and equal health coverage,’ including contracep-
tive coverage.” Id. at 1560 (citations omitted). The 
Court offered an opportunity for the parties to develop 
a resolution. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that it 
made no ruling on whether employers’ religious free-
dom was burdened, whether the government had a 
compelling interest, and whether the regulations were 
the least restrictive means of the serving that interest. 
Id.  
 Nothing in Zubik supported a legal conclusion 
that women should not receive their no-cost contracep-
tive coverage. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence urged 
that women not be left “in limbo” without contraceptive 
coverage as the positions were debated. Id. at 1561 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 The discussion suggested by Zubik did not reach 
an agreement. Instead, the administration passed two 
government rules that reduce employees’ access to con-
traceptive insurance. See Religious Exemptions and 
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Accommodations Under the ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536; 
Moral Exemptions and Accommodations Under the 
ACA, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592. Those rules effectively: 
[A]uthorized all private entities to opt out of 
the contraceptive guarantee for religious rea-
sons; allowed all but publicly traded cor-
porations to do so for moral reasons; 
reiterated that compliance with the accommo-
dation was voluntary; and affirmed that the 
rules do not impose any notice require-
ment on employers that opt out. 
Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp’n [to cert petition] 7–8 (emphasis 
added). 
 On behalf of thousands of employees of religious 
or moral organizations and their dependents, Amici 
urge this Court to affirm the Third Circuit’s ruling that 
the government’s amendments to the contraception in-
surance coverage rules are illegal. Pennsylvania v. 
President, 930 F.3d 543, 573 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he  
Religious Exemption and the new optional Accommo-
dation would impose an undue burden on nonbenefi-
ciaries—the female employees who will lose coverage 
for contraceptive care.”). The rules limit employee ac-
cess to contraception in two ways. First, they exempt 
more employers from the insurance requirement. 
Moreover, they end the previous accommodation, 
which had required objecting employers to notify some-
one of their decision not to provide insurance. The ac-
commodation and the notification allowed for an 
alternative source of insurance to provide coverage. 
These new harsh rules leave many women of faith 
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without contraceptive coverage unless they pay for it 
themselves. Id. (“[T]he record shows that thousands of 
women may lose contraceptive coverage if the Rule is 
enforced and frustrate their right to obtain contracep-
tives.”) (citations omitted). 
 In response to the new rules, for example, one 
Catholic employer, the University of Notre Dame, said 
it would exclude some methods of contraception from 
any insurance coverage, and then require co-pays and 
deductibles on the others. See Irish 4 Reproductive 
Health v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2020 
WL 248009, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2020). Since the 
changes to Notre Dame’s insurance coverage, I4RH 
Member 1 paid coinsurance for her oral contraceptive; 
I4RH Member 2 paid coinsurance for a NuvaRing and 
because of cost she switched to an intrauterine device, 
for which she pays cost-sharing; all I4RH Members pay 
cost-sharing for some contraceptives and are denied 
other contraceptives; Ms. Reifenberg’s contraceptive 
plan would no longer cover all of her long-acting re-
versible form of contraception and is subject to a 
deductible; and many other Jane Does have paid coin-
surance for their contraceptive coverage. Compl. at 
¶¶ 12–16, Irish 4 Reproductive, 2020 WL 248009. 
 There are 70,514,657 Catholics identified in the 
United States. See P.J. KENEDY & SONS, THE OFFICIAL 
CATHOLIC DIRECTORY ANNO DOMINI 2116 (2019). The 
Amici respectfully ask this Court to consider the inter-
ests of employees of Catholic institutions in the United 
States. These institutions include 17,328 parishes, 
2,868 missions, 358 pastoral centers, 56 new parishes, 
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545 Catholic hospitals, 519 health care centers, 1,958 
specialized homes, 284 orphanages, 890 day care cen-
ters, 2,716 special centers for social services, 69 dioce-
san seminaries, 58 religious cemeteries, 228 colleges 
and universities, 705 high schools (diocesan and par-
ish), 593 high schools (private), 4816 elementary 
schools (diocesan and parish), 365 elementary schools 
(private), and 126 non-residential schools for the disa-
bled. Id. 
 The Catholic hospitals alone employ more than 
536,396 full-time and 214,936 part-time employees. 
See CATH. HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., U.S. CATHOLIC 
HEALTH CARE 1 (2020), https://www.chausa.org/docs/ 
default-source/default-document-library/the-strategic- 
profile-of-catholic-health-care-in-the-united-states_ 
2020.pdf ?sfvrsn=0. The professional staff of the Cath-
olic elementary and secondary schools was 146,367. 
See Catholic School Data, NAT’L CATH. EDUC. ASS’N, 
https://www.ncea.org/ncea/proclaim/catholic_school_ 
data/catholic_school_data.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 
2020). “Catholic colleges and universities employ more 
than 107,000 members.” Jobs: Connecting the Catholic 
higher education community, ASS’N OF CATH. CS. AND 
UNIVS., https://www.accunet.org/Jobs (last visited Mar. 
30, 2020). 
 Eighty nine percent of American Catholics disa-
gree with their church’s absolute ban on the use of con-
traception. See Rich Barlow, The World Needs More Birth 
Control, Not Less. Can Someone Please Tell the Catholic 
Church?, WBUR.ORG (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/ 
cognoscenti/2018/08/09/catholic-church-sex-contraception- 
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rich-barlow (citing Michael J. O’Loughlin, Poll finds 
many U.S. Catholics breaking with church over contra-
ception, abortion and L.G.B.T. rights, AMERICA (Sept. 
28, 2016), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2016/ 
09/28/poll-finds-many-us-catholics-breaking-church-over- 
contraception-abortion-and-lgbt). Among sexually-active 
Catholic women, 99% have used contraception during 
their lives, and of at-risk Catholics, 89% currently use 
contraception. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: 
CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE U.S. 1 (July 2018), https:// 
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_ 
contr_use_0.pdf; CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, THE FACTS 
TELL THE STORY: CATHOLICS AND CHOICE 2014-2015, 4 
(2014), http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/12/FactsTelltheStory2014.pdf. “Contra-
ceptive services and supplies can be costly.” Id. 
 These new rules violate women’s reproductive and 
religious freedom rights. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Ken-
nedy explained: 
Among the reasons the United States is so 
open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person 
may be restricted or demeaned by government 
in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither 
may that same exercise unduly restrict other 
persons, such as employees, in protecting their 
own interests, interests the law deems compel-
ling. 
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 739 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., does not au-
thorize the government’s proposed new restrictions on 
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the health interests of employees. The Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit them. 
 Although RFRA requires that these employees’ 
compelling interests in religious and reproductive free-
dom be considered in any accommodation of their em-
ployers’ religious freedom, the government has now 
expanded the exemption and ended the accommoda-
tion that protected the employees’ interests. More em-
ployers have now received a complete exemption from 
the birth control benefit of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), with no requirement to tell anyone of their de-
cision. This overbroad and total exemption unduly re-
stricts employees of faith and their dependents from 
protecting their own compelling interests. Thus, the 
government’s exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which 
does not permit “requests for religious accommoda-
tions [that] become excessive, impose unjustified bur-
dens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize 
an institution’s effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U.S. 709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s 
parallel statute, the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et 
seq. (2018)). 
 In the Catholic world alone, many workers could 
lose access to no-cost insurance. To apply RFRA 
properly, this Court “must take adequate account of the 
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). In con-
trast to Hobby Lobby, in this case there is no “existing, 
recognized, workable, and already-implemented 
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framework to provide coverage,” and the “mechanism 
for doing so is [not] already in place.” Hobby Lobby, 573 
U.S. at 739. Thus the burden on employees’ rights 
would be immediate, excessive, and extreme if this 
Court were to grant Petitioners’ request to approve the 
government’s complete exemption of employers from 
the birth control benefit and the accommodation no-
tice. 
 The new rules also endanger women (and their 
children and families) if they cannot get access to no-
cost contraception, especially in these difficult eco-
nomic times. Stephanie P. Brown & Sara LaLumia, The 
Effects of Contraception on Female Poverty, 33 J. OF 
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 602, 620 (July 2014) (“[W]e es-
timate that birth control access reduces the probability 
that a woman is in poverty by 0.5 percentage points.”); 
Anna Bernstein & Kelly M. Jones, The Economic Ef-
fects of Contraceptive Access: A Review of the Evidence, 
INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL. RES. 5–6 (2019), https://iwpr. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/B381_Contraception- 
Access_Final.pdf (finding that access to contraception 
improved women’s educational attainment, labor force 
participation, career outcomes, earnings, and financial 
position); Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Contraception 
and mental health: a commentary on the evidence of 
principle for practice, AMER. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY 740, 741 (June 2015) (“Prospective population-
based cohort studies and clinical placebo-controlled 
trials have consistently reported similar or even lower 
rates of depression or mood symptoms in COC [com-
bined oral contraceptive pills] users compared with 
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nonusers.”); Kelli Stidham Hall et al., Role of Young 
Women’s Depression and Stress Symptoms in Their 
Weekly Use and Nonuse of Contraceptive Methods, 53 
J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 241, 241 (Feb. 2013) (“women 
with moderate/severe stress symptoms had more than 
twice the odds of contraception nonuse that women 
without stress”); R. Wilcher et al., From effectiveness to 
impact: contraception as an HIV prevention interven-
tion, 84 SEX. TRANSM. INFECT. ii54, ii54 (Oct. 2008), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uh.edu/docview/ 
1781826674?accountid=7107 (“Increasing voluntary 
contraceptive use has been an underused approach, de-
spite clear evidence that preventing pregnancies in 
HIV-infected women who do not wish to become preg-
nant is an effective strategy for reducing HIV-positive 
births.”); CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND CONTROLLED FERTIL-
ITY 156 (Allan M. Parnell ed., 1989) (“[T]he psychoso-
cial consequences to women of contraceptive use . . . 
are no less compelling than their physical health and 
life chances.”) [hereinafter CONTRACEPTIVE USE]; Ado-
lescents: health risks and solutions, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.who.int/news-room/ 
fact-sheets/detail/adolescents-health-risks-and-solutions 
(“The leading cause of death for 15-19 year-old girls 
globally is complications from pregnancy and child-
birth.”); see generally CONTRACEPTIVE USE, at 52-54 
(various studies have found that use of oral contracep-
tives reduces endometrial and ovarian cancers,benign 
breast disease, fibrocystic disease, pelvic inflammatory 
disease, iron-deficiency anemia, and various types of 
ovarian cysts); Sarah R. Crissey, Effect of pregnancy in-
tention on child well-being and development, 24 POP. 
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RES. & POL’Y REV. 593, 606 (“pregnancies reported as 
unintended are associated with higher risk, with chil-
dren from unintended pregnancies where no birth con-
trol was used having significantly higher risks of less 
than excellent health compared with children from in-
tended pregnancies where no birth control was used.”). 
 This Court’s RFRA and RLUIPA “decisions indi-
cate that an accommodation must be measured so that 
it does not override other significant interests.” Cutter, 
544 U.S. at 722. Numerous significant interests are at 
stake in this case. In addition to the government’s “le-
gitimate and compelling interest in the health of fe-
male employees,” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 737, the 
employees have religious freedom and reproductive 
freedom interests that will be negated if their employ-
ers are completely exempted from any obligation to 
comply with the law of health insurance. A complete 
exemption for Petitioners would not serve any of the 
government’s or women employees’ compelling inter-
ests. 
 
II. The Government’s Interpretation of RFRA 
Violates the Separation of Powers by Ag-
grandizing the Executive Branch’s Power 
at the Expense of Congress and the Courts. 
 The Department’s interpretation of its power un-
der RFRA to sweep away duly enacted law is an un-
constitutional aggrandizement of its power vis-à-vis 
Congress and the courts. For this reason, the attempt 
to shield all religious believers from a de minimis 
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burden at the expense of millions of women must be 
invalidated. 
 With respect to Congress, under Article I of the 
Constitution, Congress has the authority to make the 
law. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757–58 
(1996); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). The ex-
ecutive branch has the power to enforce the law, and 
when it veers into the lane of creating the law, it vio-
lates the separation of powers. Gundy v. United States, 
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121, 2123, 2129 (2019); id. at 2131 
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2134, 2135, 2138, 2144 
(Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
With RFRA, Congress enacted an accommodation cal-
culus to be applied in specific cases, not a total-exemp-
tion-for-all-believers license. 
 It is important to understand RFRA’s legislative 
history to see just how far the Trump Administration 
is going to turn RFRA from a vehicle for judicially-
crafted religious accommodation of a law into a blank 
check to gut duly enacted federal statutes to serve cer-
tain religious believers. RFRA was passed in 1993 in 
response to Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). It was pushed by a group of religious and civil 
rights organizations that has since splintered, see 
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF 
EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 23–31 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press ed., 2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter HAMILTON], but 
their primary message at the time was that the Su-
preme Court wrongly decided Smith and Congress 
should remedy it. They did not obtain in Smith the 
strict scrutiny standard they sought from this Court, 
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so they asked Congress to codify their preferred consti-
tutional standard. RFRA is in fact the codification of a 
new constitutional standard for free exercise—hyper 
strict scrutiny. This is a standard that the Supreme 
Court had not previously embraced in its free exercise 
cases, as this Court pointed out in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507, 533–34 (1997) (stating that the vast 
majority of laws, although passing scrutiny under the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, would fail 
under RFRA); see also HAMILTON, at 18–21 (laying out 
the differences between RFRA and the Supreme 
Court’s free exercise doctrine). 
 The primary objection to Smith was this Court’s 
approving nod toward legislative accommodation in 
the United States, wherein lawmakers have been the 
primary source of accommodation rather than a rule 
under the First Amendment that puts courts in the po-
sition of having to nullify legislative enactment: 
Values that are protected against government 
interference through enshrinement in the Bill 
of Rights are not thereby banished from the 
political process. Just as a society that be-
lieves in the negative protection accorded to 
the press by the First Amendment is likely to 
enact laws that affirmatively foster the dis-
semination of the printed word, so also a soci-
ety that believes in the negative protection 
accorded to religious belief can be expected to 
be solicitous of that value in its legislation as 
well. It is therefore not surprising that a num-
ber of States have made an exception to their 
drug laws for sacramental peyote use. 
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Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (citations omitted). The anti-
Smith message was that it is unfair to ask religious 
entities, especially minority religions, to obtain legisla-
tive accommodation. Ironically, at the same time, the 
Native American Church achieved peyote exemptions 
across the United States. HAMILTON, at 33. The critics 
of Smith demanded that Congress enact a statute that 
would give such believers greater power to go to the 
courts to obtain exemptions. The result was RFRA. 
 No one was arguing that the federal agencies 
should be able to turn case-by-case judicial accommo-
dation into a free pass for religious believers to avoid 
whatever law the executive selects. Of course, no one 
suggested that. Such an interpretation of RFRA would 
be a violation of the Establishment Clause, which does 
not permit the government to “aid one religion . . . or 
prefer one religion over another” or to “prefer religion 
over nonreligion.” Everson v. Dept. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 
15 (1947); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985). The 
possibility that RFRA might be interpreted beyond its 
own boundaries always existed, of course, which is why 
RFRA includes an explicit provision that states it will 
not exceed the Establishment Clause: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
to affect, interpret, or in any way address 
that portion of the First Amendment pro- 
hibiting laws respecting the establishment of 
religion (referred to in this section as the “Es-
tablishment Clause”). Granting government 
funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent 
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permissible under the Establishment Clause, 
shall not constitute a violation of this chapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. 
 With respect to the courts, Congress created in 
RFRA a private right of action in the courts for those 
individuals or entities aggrieved by a law, not a dele-
gation to the executive branch to do whatever it 
chooses for believers. The plain language of RFRA pro-
vides for a private right of action in the courts for indi-
viduals or entities, period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) 
(providing that a person whose religious exercise has 
been burdened “may assert that violation . . . in a judi-
cial proceeding”) (emphasis added); Gonzales v. O Cen-
tro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
434 (2006) (“RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation 
of the courts to consider whether exceptions are re-
quired under the test set forth by Congress.”). It is not 
a license to permit the executive branch to unilaterally 
exempt all religious believers from a law as the De-
partment argues in this case. 
 There is also strong evidence in RFRA’s compan-
ion bill, the RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., that 
Congress did not intend for federal agencies to be able 
to use RFRA as a sword to slice through duly enacted 
laws.3 RLUIPA provides that local governments may 
 
 3 After RFRA was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 536, the activists returned to Congress to demand re-
enactment. There was consideration of a law virtually identical to 
RFRA, the Religious Liberty Protection Act, but in the end, Con-
gress passed a new RFRA to be applied solely to federal law, and 
RLUIPA, to create causes of action against local and state  
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“cure” a potential RLUIPA violation voluntarily before 
a lawsuit is filed. “A government may avoid the 
preemptive force . . . of this chapter by changing the 
policy . . . exempting the substantially burdened reli-
gious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy 
. . . or by any other means that eliminates the substan-
tial burden.” § 2000cc-3. There is no such language in 
RFRA. Instead, RFRA was intended to be and is by its 
plain language, a private right of action for the courts. 
 Under the Department’s interpretation of its 
power in this case, when Congress enacts a judicial 
mechanism to obtain accommodation that is triggered 
by a law’s substantial burden placed on a religious be-
liever, the federal government can simply nullify the 
law in toto for all religious believers. That leap is 
simply too far. 
 Even if the Department’s blanket exemption were 
found to be a constitutional exercise of its power, the 
infringement on Congress’ power is extreme, and 
crosses constitutional boundaries. As the Ninth Circuit 
has stated: 
[E]ven assuming that agencies are authorized 
to provide a mechanism for resolving per-
ceived RFRA violations, RFRA likely does not 
authorize the religious exemption at issue in 
this case, for two independent reasons. First, 
the religious exemption contradicts congres-
sional intent that all women have access to 
 
governments for religious landowners and religious institutional-
ized persons. HAMILTON, at 28. 
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appropriate preventative care. The religious 
exemption is thus notably distinct from the 
accommodation, which attempts to accommo-
date religious objectors while still meeting the 
ACA’s mandate that women have access to 
preventative care. The religious exemption 
here chooses winners and losers between the 
competing interests of two groups, a quintes-
sentially legislative task. Strikingly, Congress 
already chose a balance between those com-
peting interests and chose both to mandate 
preventative care and to reject religious and 
moral exemptions. The agencies cannot re-
verse that legislatively chosen balance 
through rulemaking. 
California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941 
F.3d 410, 427 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 
 The drafters of RFRA directed the courts to en-
gage in a case-by-case analysis to determine accommo-
dation through the “substantial burden” calculus. 
“Federal courts accept neither self-certifications that a 
law substantially burdens a plaintiff ’s exercise of reli-
gion nor blanket assertions that a law furthers a com-
pelling governmental interest. Instead, before 
reaching those conclusions, courts make individualized 
determinations dependent on the facts of the case. . . .” 
Id. at 427–28. 
 The facts of this case also demonstrate the govern-
ment regulations violate the Establishment Clause.   
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III. The Government’s New Rules Violate the 
First Amendment. 
 “At some point, accommodation [of religious free-
dom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of reli-
gion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quot-
ing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 
480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached here, 
where the government gives Petitioners a complete ex-
emption from the contraceptive benefit. Like the Con-
necticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed] 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified 
right not to work on whatever day they designate as 
their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this case 
violates the Establishment Clause through its “un-
yielding weighting in favor of [religious organizations] 
over all other interests,” especially the interests of 
women of faith in furthering their reproductive health 
and protecting their religious freedom. Caldor, 472 
U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. 
 This Court has distinguished between religious 
exemptions and accommodations, which are permitted 
by the “play in the joints” between the Religion 
Clauses, and religious preferences, which the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits. Compare Amos, 483 U.S. at 
334 (discussing how the government is able to “accom-
modate religious practices . . . without violating the 
Establishment Clause”), with Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709–
11 (holding that the Connecticut statute allowing em-
ployees that observe a Sabbath to be able to do so 
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without any exceptions for special circumstances was 
unconstitutional). The government must heed this 
Court’s warning that “[a]t some point, accommodation 
may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’ ” 
and violate the Establishment Clause. Amos, 483 U.S. 
at 334–35 (quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145); see also 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“[t]he princi-
ple that government may accommodate the free exer-
cise of religion does not supersede the fundamental 
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause”). 
The point of unlawful fostering of religion is reached 
with the government’s complete exemption. 
 In Cutter, this Court observed that a religious ex-
emption may violate the Establishment Clause if it 
does not take account of the burden of the exemption 
on nonbeneficiaries. 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Bd. of Educ. 
of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994)); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. 
Dist., 512 U.S. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] re-
ligious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to en-
sure that it does not so burden nonadherents.”). The 
government’s two rules have not taken into account 
the contraceptive needs of employees and the result is 
that employees have to pay for no-cost insurance. The 
rules are thus different from the government’s other 
exemptions, which generally “involve legislative ex-
emptions that did not, or would not, impose substantial 
burdens on nonbeneficiaries while allowing others to 
act according to their religious beliefs.” Texas Monthly, 
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989). 
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 In Caldor, this Court approvingly identified “a 
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand: ‘The First Amend-
ment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit 
of their own interests others must conform their con-
duct to his own religious necessities.’ ” Caldor, 472 U.S. 
at 709–10 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 
205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). Amici endorse this con-
stitutional principle as a matter of faith; as Catholics 
Amici believe that every person must enjoy “freedom or 
immunity from coercion in matters religious.” Pope 
Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis 
Humanae on the Right of the Person and of Communi-
ties to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious, 
THE HOLY SEE 681 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican. 
va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ 
vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.  
Nonetheless, this coercion is precisely what Petitioners 
received in this case: the right to block their employees 
from contraceptive insurance. In defiance of the First 
Amendment, the government requests an “absolute 
and unqualified” exemption where “religious concerns 
automatically control over all secular interests in the 
workplace,” “no matter what burden or inconvenience 
this imposes on the . . . workers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 
708–09. 
 Neither RFRA nor the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment grants Petitioners a right to com-
plete and costly exemption from the ACA, and the Es-
tablishment Clause prohibits it. The exemption does 
not take account of the burden on nonbeneficiaries and 
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is therefore unconstitutional. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 
720 (“courts must take adequate account of the bur-
dens a requested accommodation may impose on non-
beneficiaries, and they must be satisfied that the Act’s 
prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally 
among different faiths”) (citations omitted). 
 The best way to prevent RFRA from acquiring 
such “breadth and sweep” is for this Court “to ensure 
that interests in religious freedom are protected.” 
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). Amici respectfully ask this Court to 
ensure that the religious interests of Catholic and non-
Catholic workers and their dependents are protected 
so that they may “preserv[e] their own dignity” and re-
ceive the contraceptive insurance without cost to 
which they are entitled. Id. We ask you to affirm the 
Third Circuit’s decision. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Amici Curiae—CHILD USA, DignityUSA, 
New Ways Ministry, the Quixote Center, the Women’s 
Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual, and the 
Women’s Ordination Conference—respectfully ask this 
Court to reject the government’s complete exemption of 
employers from providing the birth control benefit  
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of the Affordable Care Act and to affirm the judgment 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit. 
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